Preventive maintenance of operational software systems, a novel technique for software fault tolerance, is used speci cally to counteract the phenomenon of software \aging". However, it incurs some overhead. The necessity to do preventive maintenance not only in general purpose software systems of mass use but also in safety-critical and highly available systems clearly indicates the need to follow an analysis based approach to determine the optimal times to perform preventive maintenance.
Introduction
It is now well established that system outages are caused more due to software faults than due to hardware faults 24, 11] . Given the current growth in software complexity and reuse, the trend is not likely to change. It is also well known that regardless of development, testing and debugging time, software still contains some residual faults. Thus, fault tolerant software has become an e ective alternative to virtually impossible fault-free software. The scope of this paper lies in the quantitative evaluation of a novel technique for software fault tolerance, viz., preventive maintenance of operational software systems. Although, the use of preventive maintenance is common in physical systems, its potential e ectiveness in enhancing software dependability has only recently been recognized. As we shall exemplify later, in certain situations, it is simply necessary.
Traditional methods of software fault-tolerance, namely N-version programming 2], recovery blocks 23] and N-self checking programming 19] are all based on design diversity, where independently operating teams of developers generate two or more variants of software from the same set of speci cations. Another common characteristic in all of the above techniques is their reactive nature, i.e., the fault tolerance mechanism, or rather fault masking, takes e ect after at least one version has experienced failure. The idea being that at least a subset of the variants will not fail and therefore be collectively su cient to provide the correct output. The primary drawback of all the above techniques is the extremely high cost involved in generating multiple versions which restricts their use to safety-critical software such as for atomic power plants, railroad switching etc. 18], where the cost is justi ed.
Primarily, the following two factors motivate the need to explore alternate techniques for software fault tolerance.
Reliability/Availability Versus Cost
The need for high reliability and availability is not just restricted to safety-critical systems 11]. Telephone switches 7], airline reservation systems, process and production control, stock trading system, computerized banking etc. all demand very high avail-ability. A survey showed that computer downtime in non-safety critical systems cost over 3:8 Billion in 1991 in U.S. 25]. With current explosive increase in the popularity of network centric computing, web servers too need to be highly available. In most of these systems, the cost of providing fault tolerance via use of multiple variants is prohibitive. With commercial considerations driving technology more than ever, release times of software are required to be less and less forcing organizations to reduce testing and debugging cycle times. Further, with software reuse gaining popularity, many times, it is simply not feasible to test the middleware and operating system on which the nal software product is based. This leaves no option but to tolerate the residual faults during its operational phase.
Nature of software failures
More recently, from the study of eld failure data, it has been observed that a large percentage of operational software failures are transient in nature 12, 13, 17] , caused by phenomena such as overloads or timing and exception errors 24, 5] . A common characteristic of these type of failures is that upon re-execution of the software, the failure does not recur. The error condition, which results in the failure, typically manifests itself in the operating environment of the executing software. Due to the complexity of modern-day operating systems and intermediate layer software, it has been observed that the same error condition, when the software is re-executed, is unlikely to recur, thus avoiding the failure.
communication channels, keyboard, monitors, time etc. 27]. Typical transient failures occur because of design faults in software which result in unacceptable erroneous states in the OS environment of the process. Therefore, the key idea behind environment diversity is to modify the operating environment of the running process. Typically, this has been done on a corrective basis, i.e., upon a failure, the software is restarted after some cleanup, which in most cases results in a di erent, error free OS environment state thus avoiding further failure.
Recently, the phenomenon of software \aging" 16] has come to light where such error conditions actually accrue with time and/or load. This observation has led to proposals of a pro-active approach to environment diversity in which the operational software is occasionally stopped and \cleaned up" to remove any potential error conditions. Since the preventive actions can be performed at suitable times (such as when there is no load on the system), it typically results in lesser downtime and cost than the corrective approach. Even so, it incurs some overhead and if done more often than necessary will result in higher downtime/cost. Therefore, an important research issue is to determine the optimal times to perform preventive maintenance of operational software systems.
In this paper, we present a stochastic model for a transactions based software system which employs preventive maintenance (henceforth referred to as PM). Three measures, availability of the software to provide service, probability of loss of a transaction and response time of a transaction are considered. The model is developed under very general conditions and requires numerical solution. We compute each of the three measures under two policies for PM, which were proposed in 9], in the same framework. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present real life examples of aging and PM to illustrate the di erent forms in which they occur and to motivate the need for analysis of such systems. In Section 3, we describe the system model, along with assumptions on modeling aging, failure and PM policies. Section 4 comprises of the analytical solution of the model for availability, loss probability and response time measures. In Section 5, we illustrate the usefulness of the models via numerical examples. The two PM policies are compared along with the e ect of model parameters on the derived measures. It is shown that the PM interval which maximizes availability may be very di erent from the PM interval which minimizes the probability of loss or the response time, indicating caution in the selection of the optimum PM interval. Finally, in Section 6, we present the conclusions.
Preventive Maintenance of Operational Software
While monitoring real applications, the phenomenon of software \aging" has been reported. It is observed that potential fault conditions slowly accumulate over time since the beginning of the software execution resulting in performance degradation and/or transient failures 1 . Failures of both crash/hang type as well as those resulting in data inconsistency because of aging have been reported. Memory bloating and leaking, unreleased le-locks, data corruption, storage space fragmentation and accumulation of roundo errors are some typical causes of slow degradation. Examples of aging can be found not only in software used on a mass scale but also in specialized software used in high-availability and safety critical applications.
Widely used web browser \Netscape" is known to su er from serious memory leaking problems which leads to occasional crash or hang of the application(s), especially in a computer with relatively low swap space. Similar memory leaking problem has been reported in the news-reader program \xrn". All PC users are familiar with the occasional \switch o and on" of the computer to recover from hangs. Such examples of aging in software of mass-use are probably just an inconvenience, but in systems with high reliability/availability requirements, software aging can result in high cost. Huang et. al. report this phenomenon in telecommunications billing applications where over time the application experiences a crash or a hang failure 16]. Avritzer and Weyuker have witnessed aging in telecommunications' switching software where the e ect manifests as gradual performance degradation 3]. The service rate of the software decreases with time increasing queue lengths and eventually starts losing packets. Perhaps the most vivid example of aging can be found in 21], where the failure resulted in loss of human life. Patriot missiles, used during the Gulf war to destroy Iraq's Scud missiles used a computer whose software accumulated error. The e ect of aging in this case was mis-interpretation of an incoming Scud as not a missile but just a false alarm, which resulted in the death of twenty-eight U.S. soldiers.
One way to counteract aging is to avoid the fault itself. Speci cally, for memory leaks, commercially available packages like Purify and Insure++ exist. These, however, are for use during the development phase with which memory leaks in a software can be detected and corrected. Given that not all faults can be avoided (memory leakage is a very small subset of faults resulting in aging) and that sometimes, it is simply not feasible to x faults (use of third party software, unavailability of source code etc.), the complimentary approach of tolerating the residual faults must be employed. Moreover, the fault tolerance technique must not only be e cient in terms of providing the necessary reliability or availability but must be cost e ective as well. Given the observed nature of failures, PM of operational software is a potential candidate.
Huang et. al. 16 ] have proposed the technique of \Software Rejuvenation", which simply involves stopping the running software occasionally, removing the accrued error conditions and restarting the software. Garbage collection, ushing operating system kernel tables, reinitializing internal data structures are some examples of what cleaning the internal state of a software might involve. An extreme, but well-known example of rejuvenation is a hardware reboot. It has been implemented in the real-time system collecting billing data for most telephone exchanges in the United States 4] . A very similar technique has been used by Avritzer and Weyuker in a large telecommunications switching software 3], where the switching computer is rebooted occasionally upon which its service rate is restored to the peak value. They call it software capacity restoration. Both of the above independently used techniques are speci c cases of PM performed on operational software. Grey 14] proposed performing operations solely for fault management in SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) software which are invoked whether or not the fault exists and called it \operational redundancy". Tai et. al. 26] have proposed and analyzed the use of on-board PM for maximizing the probability of successful mission completion of spacecrafts with very long mission times. In a safety critical environment also, the necessity of performing PM is evident from the example of aging in Patriot's software 21]. In the words of the author, On 21 February, the o ce sent out a warning that \very long running time" could a ect the targeting accuracy. The troops were not told, however, how many hours \very long" was, or that it would help to switch the computer o and on again after 8 hours.
The concept of PM as such is not new. All system administrators, whether responsible for small system setup or for large commercial system setups such as banking, reservations systems, inventory control systems etc. routinely perform PM, even if on an ad-hoc basis. In some cases, it is performed on a per process basis, while in others a system wide maintenance is done. In each case, however, the maintenance incurs an overhead which should be balanced against the cost incurred due to unexpected outage caused because of a failure. This in turn demands a quantitative analysis, which in the context of software systems has only recently started getting attention. Mr. Bernstein stresses the need of emergence of a new eld \software dynamics" 4] and calls for \developing the design constraints, analytically, to make software behavior periodic and stable in its operational phase".
The contribution of this paper lies in presenting an analytical model for transaction based software which experiences aging and employs PM to avoid unexpected outages. Furthermore, two policies for PM are analyzed; 1. Purely time based: PM is performed at xed deterministic interval 2. Time and load based: PM is attempted at xed intervals and performed only if the software is currently not serving any transactions.
In both cases, equations for steady state availability, long run probability of a transaction loss and an upper bound on mean response time are derived.
Previous Work
The single most important factor (as shall be shown via numerical example) in determining the accuracy of such a model is the assumptions made in capturing aging. Primarily, assumptions regarding the following aspects of aging need to be made.
E ect of Aging: E ect of aging has been witnessed as crash/hang failure, which results in unavailability of the software, and gradual performance degradation 2 . User perceivable impact of one may be dominant than the other, but typically both are present to some degree in a software which experiences aging. In 16, 8, 9, 10, 26] only the failures causing unavailability of the software are considered, while in 22] considers only a gradually decreasing service rate of a software which serves transactions is assumed. In this paper, we consider both the e ects together in a single model.
Distribution: There is no consensus on the time to failure distribution of an operational software and of the nature of service degradation it experiences. Therefore, for wide applicability, it is essential that a model be able to accommodate general distributions and not be restricted to predetermined ones. This way, with the availability of data, a speci c distribution can then be applied on a per system basis. Models proposed in 16, 8, 9 ] are restricted to hypo-exponentially distributed time to failure. Those proposed in 10, 22, 26] can accommodate general distributions but only for the speci c aging e ect they capture. In our model, we allow for generally distributed time to failure as well as for the service rate to be an arbitrary function of time.
Dependence on Load: None of the previous studies capture the e ect of load on aging. As it has been noted 24] that transient failures are partly caused by overload conditions, in our model, we allow for the failure and the service rates to be functions of time, instantaneous load, mean accumulated load or a combination of the above. Table 1 summarizes the di erences in capturing the e ect of aging and on the assumptions in the distribution and dependence of these e ects in previous work. It also shows the di erences in the measures evaluated. In 10, 26] software with a nite mission time is considered. Mean completion time in the presence of aging failures is computed in 10] whereas is 26], the probability of successful completion by the mission deadline is computed. In the rest 16, 8, 9] as well as in this paper, measures of interest in a transaction based software intended to run forever are evaluated. Where in 16] and 8], only the steady state availability is computed, both steady state availability as well as the long run probability that a transaction is denied service are computed in 9]. In transaction based systems, the users are sometimes more interested in response time. In this paper, we evaluate the steady state availability, the probability of loss of a transaction as well as an upper bound on the mean response time of a transaction. Optimizing one may result in an unacceptable value for the other. Optimal selection based on constraints on one or more of the measures can then be made via solution of our model. Lastly, all previous models except 10] and 26] are just special cases of the model presented in this paper.
The rest of the paper deals with the proposed model, evaluation of the three measures and numerical examples.
System Model
The system we study consists of a server type software to which transactions arrive at a constant rate . Each transaction receives service for a random period. The service rate of the software is an arbitrary function measured from the last renewal of the software (because of aging) denoted by ( ). Therefore, a transaction which starts service at time t 1 , occupies the server for a time whose distribution is given by 1 ? e ? R t t 1 ( ) dt . ( ) can be a constant, a function of time t, a function of the instantaneous load on the system, a function of total processing done in a given interval or a combination of the above. We shall defer the explicit speci cation of the parameter in ( ) till Section 3.1.
If the software is busy processing a transaction, arriving customers are queued. Total number of transactions that the software can accommodate is K (including the one being processed) and any more arriving when the queue is full are lost. The service discipline is FCFS. This state, in which the software is available for service (albeit with decreasing service rate) is denoted as state \A" (see Figure 1) . Further, the software can fail upon which recovery procedure is started. This state, in which the software is recovering and is unavailable for service is denoted as state \B". The rate at which it fails, i.e., at which the software moves from state A to state B is denoted by ( ). Let the time to failure be denoted by random variable X. Then, its distribution is given by F X (t) = 1 ? e ? R t 0 ( ) dt :
Like ( ), ( ) can also be function of time, instantaneous load, mean accumulated load or a combination of the above. Explicit speci cation of ( ) shall be deferred till Section 3.1.
The e ect of aging, therefore, may be captured by using decreasing service rate and increasing failure rate, where the decrease or the increase respectively can be a function of time, instantaneous load, mean accumulated load or a combination of the above. The service degradation and hang/crash failures in our model are assumed to be stochastically independent processes. Their interdependence, if it exists in the real system, can be approximated by using parametric dependence in the de nitions of ( ) and ( ). The failure process is stochastically independent of the arrival process and any transactions in the queue at the time of failure are assumed to be lost. Moreover, any transactions which arrive while recovery is in progress are also lost. Time to recover from a failed state is denoted by Y f with associated general distribution F Y f .
Lastly, the software occasionally undergoes PM. This state is denoted as state \C". PM is allowed only from state \A". We consider two di erent policies which determine the time to perform PM.
1. Purely time based. Under this policy, henceforth referred to as Policy I, PM is initiated after a constant time has elapsed since it was started (or restarted). We shall refer to under this policy as the PM interval.
2. Instantaneous load and time based. Under this policy, henceforth referred to as Policy II, a constant waiting period must elapse before PM is attempted. Further, after this time, PM is initiated if and only if there are no transactions in the system. under this policy shall be referred to as PM wait. The actual PM interval under Policy II is determined by the sum of PM wait and the time it takes for the queue to get empty from that point onwards. The latter quantity is dependent on system parameters and can not be controlled. The actual PM interval, therefore has a range ; 1).
Regardless of the policy used, it takes a random amount of time, denoted by Y r , to perform PM. Let F Yr be its distribution. As will be showed in the following section, our model does not require any assumptions on the nature of F Y f and F Yr . Only the respective expectations f = E Y f ] and r = E Y r ] are assumed to be nite.
Once recovery from the failed state or PM is complete, the software is reset in state A and is as good as new. From this moment, which constitutes a renewal, the whole process stochastically repeats itself. The transition behavior of the software among states A, B and C is illustrated in Figure 1 .
The queuing behavior of the software, on the other hand, as determined by the two PM policies is illustrated in Figure 2 . The horizontal axis represents time t and the vertical axis represents the number of transactions queued in the software at time t, denoted by N(t). In accordance with Policy I, the transactions already in the queue at time are lost. i.e., N( ) > 0. In this case, the software waits till the queue is empty upon which PM is initiated 3 This wait is a random quantity denoted in the gure by B. Intuitively, if B is very large, it is likely that the software will fail before it has a chance to undergo PM. Given the above behavioral model, for each policy, we need to:
1. Evaluate the steady state availability of the software 2. Evaluate the steady state probability that an arriving transaction will be denied service.
3. Evaluate the expected response time of a transaction successfully served.
4. Determine optimal values of (PM interval under policy I and PM wait under policy II) which provide optimal values for steady state availability, long run probability of loss and expected response time. The e ect of aging, i.e., degradation in performance and failures causing unavailability are present in varying severity in di erent systems. Further, each of them may be in uenced by di erent operating parameters in di erent software systems. We now show how, in our model, the varying severity and dependencies may be captured via proper choice of parameters of ( ) and ( ). Flexibility in this choice in the same framework widens the scope of applicability of our model to real software systems.
( ) = and ( ) = . In the simplest case, the service rate as well as the failure rate are constants. This implies that there is no performance degradation and the time to failure is exponentially distributed, which because of its memoryless property contradicts aging. Therefore, constant and do not capture the behavior of a software system which ages. This case will not be discussed further.
( ) = (t) and ( ) = (t) In this case, the service rate and the failure rates are simply functions of time. Although arbitrary functions are allowed in the model, presumably, service rate will be a mono-tone non-increasing function and the failure rate will be a monotone non-decreasing function of time in a software which ages. If (t) = t ?1 where and are constants with > 1, the time to failure has Weibull distribution with increasing failure rate, which is commonly used to model aging. To model software systems where only occasional failures are witnessed with no performance degradation, the combination ( ) = and ( ) = (t) may be used. Further, to model software systems which undergo performance degradation but are always available, the special case of ( ) = = 0 and ( ) = (t) can be used.
( ) = (N(t)) and ( ) = (N(t))
The service rate and the failure rate are functions of instantaneous load on the system, i.e., their value at time t depends on the number of transactions in the queue at that time. This dependence is useful in capturing overload e ects which in uence the failure behavior especially. Of course, more realistic combined dependence on time and instantaneous load, ( ) = (t; N(t)) and ( ) = (t; N(t)) is also allowed.
( ) = (L(t)) and ( ) = (L(t)) A more complex but also more powerful dependence can be obtained by making ( ) and ( ) as functions of mean accumulated work done by the software system in a given time interval. Let p i (t); 0 i K be the probability that there are i transactions in the queue at time t given that the software is in state \A". When the software is not aged, incoming transactions are promptly served and the total amount of time spent in actual processing in an interval (0; t] is usually less than the interval t itself. Since, an idle software is not likely to age, service and failure rates are more realistically a function of the actual processing time rather than the total available time. Let L(t) Lastly, our model allows for combination of above dependencies. For example, the failure rate may be a function of not only the mean processing time in the interval (0; t], but also of the instantaneous load at time t to account for overload e ects. In this case, ( ) = (N(t); L(t)).
In the following section, we derive the three measures for the two PM policies. 
Evaluation of Measures
Let the steady state availability of the software system be denoted by A SS . Let P loss denote the long run probability that an arriving transaction will be lost and let T res denote the expected response time of a transaction given that it is successfully served. The approach we follow in deriving the expressions for the three measures applies to both policies I and II. Only when a particular expression is di erent, it will be noted explicitly. The solution method in general, and the class of stochastic process used to model in particular, provides an elegant, concise and fast alternative to usually expensive discrete-event simulation approach.
As described in the previous section, the software can be in any one of three states at any time t. It can be up and available for service (state A), recovering from a failure (state B)
or undergoing PM (state C) (see Figure 1 ). Let fZ(t); t 0g be a stochastic process which represents the state of the software at time t. Further, let the sequence of random variables S i ; i > 0 represent the times at which transitions among di erent states take place. Then, fZ(S i ); i > 0g is an embedded discrete time Markov chain (DTMC), since the entrance times S i constitute renewal points. The transition probability matrix P for this DTMC can be easily derived from the state transition diagram shown in Figure 1 and is given by:
The steady state probability of the software being in state i; i 2 fA; B; Cg, denoted by p i , can also be determined in a straightforward manner from the well know relation = P. The software behavior as a whole is modeled via the stochastic process f(Z(t); N(t)) ; t 0g. If Z(t) = A, then N(t) 2 f0; 1; : : : ; Kg, as the software queue can accommodate up to K transactions. If Z(t) 2 fB; Cg, then N(t) = 0, since by assumption, all transactions arriving while the software is either recovering or undergoing PM are lost. Further, the transactions already in the queue at the transition instant are also discarded. It can be shown that the process f(Z(t); N(t)) ; t 0g is a Markov regenerative process (MRGP) 6].
The regeneration instants are embedded at times when the process makes transitions from state i to state j (i; j 2 fA; B; Cg), i.e. Z(t) changes. Transition to state A from either B or C constitutes a regeneration instant since by assumption, the software is reset to the original initial conditions. At these instants, the system in empty and the software is as good as new. Note that what makes the process an MRGP is the fact that within one regeneration period, the stochastic process changes state. In other words, arrivals and departures of transactions keep changing N(t) while Z(t) = A. We have already de ned and solved the embedded DTMC of this MRGP in Equations (1) and (3) respectively.
Let U be a R.V. denoting the sojourn time of f(Z(t); N(t)); t > 0g in state A. Let The probability that a transaction is lost is de ned as the ratio of expected number of transactions which are lost in an interval to the expected total number of transactions which arrive during that interval. The evolution of fZ(t); N(t)); t > 0g in the intervals comprising of successive visits to state A is stochastically identical. Therefore, for calculation of long run measures, it su ces to consider just one such interval. The expected number of transactions lost is the given by the summation of three quantities; (1) the expected number lost due to discarding because of failure or initiation of PM, (2) the expected number lost while recovery or PM is in progress and (3) the expected number lost due to the bu er being full. The last quantity is of special signi cance as due to the degrading service rate, the probability of bu er being full increases. (4) where:
E N l ] is the expected number of transactions in the bu er when the system is exiting state A; f is the expected number of transactions arriving while the system is recovering; r is the expected number of transactions arriving while the system is undergoing PM; R 1 0 p K (t)dt is the expected number of transactions denied service because of the bu er being full while the system is in state A; We now derive an upper bound on the mean response time of a transaction given that it is successfully served, denoted by T res . The mean number of transactions, denoted by E, which are accepted for service while the software is in state A is given by the mean total number of transactions which arrive while the software is in state A minus the mean number of transactions which are not accepted due to the bu er being full. That is,
Out of these transactions, on the average, E N l ] are discarded later because of failure and initiation of PM. Therefore, the mean number of transactions which actually receive service given that they were accepted is given by E ? E N l ]. The mean total amount of time the transactions spent in the system while the software is in state A is:
This time is composed of the mean time spent by the transactions which were served as well as those which were discarded, denoted as W S and W D , respectively; Therefore, W = W S +W D .
The response time we are interested in is given by
which is upper bounded by 4
Regardless of the PM policy, as can be observed from Equations (3) and (4), we need to obtain expected sojourn times and the steady state probability of the software in each of the three states A; B and C, as well as the transient probability that there are i; i = 0; 1; : : : ; K transactions queued up for service. It is the last quantity which forbids a closed form analytical solution and necessitates a numerical approach.
The mean sojourn time in states B and C is already available as f and r respectively 5 .
The quantities still to be derived are related with the queuing behavior of the software in state A, viz., P AB , P AC , E U] and p i (t); i = 0; 1; : : : ; K. Their evaluation depends on the policy used.
Behavior of the system in state A under Policy I
For Z(t) = A, the subordinated process, i.e., the process until a regeneration occurs, is determined by the queuing behavior of the software processing transactions. The process is terminated by either a failure (which can happen at any time) or by initiating PM which under policy I happens at time if the software has not failed by that time. Figure 3 shows the state diagram of the subordinated non-homogeneous process under policy I. It is a birth-death process augmented with one absorbing state associated with each state of the birth-death process. Not included in the gure is the fact that at t = , the subordinated process is terminated if it was not terminated before by a transition to an absorbing state (0 0 ; : : : ; K 0 ). Figure 3 : Subordinated Non-homogeneous CTMC for t By our notation, p i (t) is the probability that there are i transactions queued for service, which is also the probability of being in state i of the subordinated process at time t. Note that state i; i = 0; 1; : : : ; K is not to be confused with state i 0 ; i = 0; 1; : : : ; K which was de ned just to be able to evaluate the quantities of interest. As such, all the states under the shaded area of the process can be lumped into a single absorbing state. p i (t); i = 0; 1; : : : ; K and p i 0 (t); i 0 = 0 0 ; 1 0 ; : : : ; K 0 can be obtained by solving the following system of forward di erential-di erence equations: dp 0 (t) dt = ( )p 1 (t) ? ( + ( )) p 0 (t) dp i (t) dt = ( )p i+1 (t) + p i?1 (t) ? ( ( ) + + ( )) p i (t); 1 i < K dp K (t)
dp i One step transition probability P AB is given by: Thereafter, according to Equation (3), the steady state probability that the software is in states B and C can be obtained. The expected sojourn time in state A is given by:
where the upper limit on the integral indicates that the sojourn time is bounded by . The average value, E N l ], of the number of transactions already in the system at the time when state A is left, is evaluated as:
A SS , P loss and the upper bound on T res as given in Equations (3), (4) and (5) respectively can now be easily calculated.
Behavior of the System in State A Under Policy II
If policy II is assumed, the evolution of the system in state A is somewhat more complex. In this case we need to distinguish between t and t > , as policy II assumes that PM will be initiated if and only if the bu er is empty after time has elapsed. For t , exactly the same process of Figure 3 determines the behavior of the software. For t > , the process which models the behavior is shown in Figure 4 . As can be observed, state 0 now belongs to the set of absorbing states because PM will be initiated once the system becomes idle thus terminating the subordinated process,
The set of forward di erential-di erence equations which are solved to determine all transient probabilities are given as follows: dp 0 (t) dt = (:)p 1 (t) ? ( 0 (t) + (:)) p 0 (t) dp 1 (t) dt = (:)p 2 (t) + 0 (t)p 0 (t) ? ( (:) + + (:)) p 1 (t); dp i (t) dt = (:)p i+1 (t) + p i?1 (t) ? ( (:) + + (:)) p i (t); 2 i < K dp K (t)
dp 0 0 (t) dt = 0 (:)p 0 (t) dp i and then solved. This set of di erential-di erence equations along with the initial condition p 0 (0) = 1 also requires numerical solution.
On step transition probability P AB is computed by solving the system of ODEs at t = 1
and is given as:
The mean sojourn time in state A is now given by:
The mean number of transactions already in the queue the State A is exited is given by:
Using Equations (3), (4) and (5), the steady state availability, the probability of loss of an arriving transaction and the upper bound on the response time of a transaction can now be calculated.
Numerical Examples
In this section, we illustrate the usefulness of the models developed to evaluate A SS , P loss and the upper bound on T res . The models are solved for multiple values of (PM interval in the case of policy I and PM wait in the case of policy II) and optimal values are determined.
We also show, how the optimum value of may be selected based on combined measures of the above three quantities. The set of di erential-di erence equations given in Equations (6) and (8) for policies I and II respectively were numerically solved using the LSODE routine in ANSI FORTRAN.
LSODE (Livermore Solver for Di erential Equations) is an ODE solver which uses Backward di erentiation Formula (BDF) methods for sti systems of ODEs. It is publicly available as part of ODEPACK from netlib. A single run of the model takes less than a minute. Solution using commercially available packages like Mathematica or MATLAB is also possible, but is likely to be much slower. For large bu er sizes of the order of thousands, sparse matrix methods will need to be used in the ODE solution.
Experiment 1.
In this experiment, r is varied to ascertain the e ect on the measures and on optimal . Service rate and failure rate are assumed to be functions of real time, i.e., ( ) = (t) and ( ) = (t), where (t) is de ned to be (t) = t ?1 ;
which is the hazard function of Weibull distribution. is xed at 1:5 and is calculated from the MTTF and as
The model is solved for both policies to show the e ect of the cost of PM on the three measures. (t) is de ned to be a monotone non-increasing function of t as shown in Figure 5 .
This behavior of (t) has been given in 3] as an approximation to service degradation in telecommunications switching software. For this particular experiment of varying r , (t) (as shown in Figure 5 ) is de ned as: The use of common parameter MTTF in the de nitions of (t) and (t) is simply to illustrate how dependence in the service and failure behavior can be captured via parameter sharing, even though stochastically the two processes are assumed to be independent.
In the numerical evaluation of the measures, computation at time 1 is required which is approximated by respective values at time t MAX where t MAX is associated with the required both policies, it can be seen that higher the value of r , lower is the availability for any particular value of . Under policy I, for r = 0:15 and r = 0:35, the availability rapidly increases with increase in (that is PM is performed less frequently), attains a maximum at = 160 and = 410 respectively and then gradually decreases. For r = 0:55 and r = 0:85, the steady state availability turned out to be a monotone function. In all cases, A ss eventually approaches the same value with increase in which corresponds to the steady state availability if no PM was performed. Therefore, for r = 0:55 and r = 0:85, it is better not to perform PM, if the objective is only to maximize availability. Under policy II, the steady state availability follows the same behavior as in policy I except that the value of A ss corresponding to the no PM case is reached at much lower values of , which now represents PM wait rather than the PM interval. Figure 6 (b) shows the plots of P loss against for both policies with r being assigned values as in Figure 6 (a). All the plots attain a minimum. As expected, for any speci c value of and a speci c policy, higher is the value of r , higher is the corresponding loss probability, because on average, more transactions are denied service while PM is in progress. Since the absolute values of the measures or of optimal are not of importance, we shall comment on the relative e ects only. It can be seen that for any speci c policy, lower the value of r , lower is the value of which minimizes the probability of loss for that particular r . For any speci c value of r , policy II results in a lower minima in loss probability than that achieved under policy I. Moreover this minima under policy II is achieved at a lower as compared to policy I. This clearly shows that if the objective is to minimize long run probability of loss, which is the case is telecommunication switching software, policy II always fares better than policy I. It can also be observed from Figure 6 (a) and 6(b) , that the value of which minimizes probability of loss is much lower than the one which maximizes availability. In fact, the probability of loss becomes very high at values of which maximize availability. Although the behavior is dependent on system parameter values, caution in proper selection of is indicated.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, r is xed at 0:15. ( ) = (t) and has exactly the same de nition as in Experiment 1. ( ) = (t), with previously de ned Weibull hazard rate, except that the shape parameter is now varied. Thus for each value of , corresponding is calculated using Equation (8) For = 1:0, the time to failure has an exponential distribution, which, because of its memoryless property, contradicts aging. As seen from the gure, it is better not to perform PM in this case, if the objective is to maximize availability. For the other two values of , however, PM maximizes availability at certain . For a speci c policy, peakier the failure density, i.e., higher the value of , higher is the maximum steady state availability. Secondly, with higher values , this maxima occurs at lower values of . Figure 7(b) shows the long run probability of loss of a transaction plotted against . In this case, PM proves to be bene cial for all three values of . Similar observations and arguments as those given in Experiment 1 hold for this case also.
Experiment 3
The purpose of this experiment is to illustrate the e ect of assumptions on ( ) and ( ) on the three measures. Figure 8 Each of the gures contains three curves. The solid curve represents a system where ( ) = (t) and ( ) = (t). The dotted curve represents a second system where ( ) = (L(t)) and ( ) = (L(t)). The parameters, max , min and a are kept the same. Similarly, is kept at 1:5 for both the solid as well as the dotted curve. In other words, ( ) and ( ) in the solid curve are functions of real time, whereas in the dotted curve, they are functions (with the same parameters) of the mean total processing time. The dashed curve represents a third system in which no crash/hang failures occur, i.e., ( ) = 0 but service degradation is present with ( ) = (t) with same parameters as for ( ) of earlier two systems. r for all is kept xed at 0:15, This experiment only illustrates the importance of making the right assumptions in capturing aging because as seen from the gure, depending on the forms chosen for ( ) and ( ), the measures vary in a wide range. Figure 8 plots the upper bound on the mean response time. This was not shown for Experiments 1. and 2. because of its monotone nature. In the type of system under consideration, where queued transactions as well as those arriving during recovery or PM are lost, response time of successful transactions can be trivially minimized by always keeping the software unavailable (with very low ). This however, will result in unacceptable values of the probability of loss and steady state availability. In many systems, for example ATM switches, QOS requirements are speci ed using bounds on response time as well as probability of loss. This can be achieved via our model. For example, consider the solid curve in Figure 8 (c). If QOS demands that the response time be less than 0:113 hours, is restricted approximately in the interval (0; 70]. Now, if the QOS further demands that the probability of loss be minimized, the optimal corresponds to the minimum P loss within this interval only. The curve identi ed with the legend (I,1.5), in Figure 7 (b) plots P loss against with exactly the same parameter values and it is seen that global minima for P loss occurs at = 85 whereas the optimal for the combined QOS is 70. 6 
Conclusion
In this paper, we motivated the need of pursuing preventive maintenance in operational software systems on a scienti c analytical basis rather than the current ad-hoc practice. We presented a model for a transactions based software system which employs preventive maintenance to either maximize availability, minimize probability of loss, minimize response time or optimize a combined measure. We evaluated the three measures for two di erent preventive maintenance policies and showed via numerical examples that a policy which takes into account instantaneous load on the system results in lower optimum probability of loss. The e ect of aging is captured as crash/hang failures as well as performance degradation. Systems which experience only one of the two can be modeled as special cases. The main strength of our model, however, is its capability of capturing the dependence of crash/hang failures and performance degradation on time, instantaneous load, mean accumulated load or a combination. This, in our opinion, provides great exibility in modeling real situations and widens the scope of applicability of our model. The main limitation, on the other hand, is that it is applicable to only those software systems in which incoming transactions are lost when either it fails or when PM in initiated. In many database systems which support recovery, transactions are logged when they arrive. Even when failure occurs, the log is not lost, thus violating our assumption.
